Impact
MySQLWriteTool executes arbitrary SQL provided by the caller using PDO::prepare() + execute() without semantic restrictions.
This is consistent with the name (“write tool”), but in an LLM/agent context it becomes a high-risk capability: prompt injection or indirect prompt manipulation can cause execution of destructive queries such as DROP TABLE, TRUNCATE, DELETE, ALTER, or privilege-related statements (subject to DB permissions).
Who is impacted: Deployments that expose an agent with MySQLWriteTool enabled to untrusted input and/or run the tool with a DB user that has broad privileges.
Patches
Not patched in: 2.8.11
Recommended improvements (even if keeping the tool intentionally powerful):
Provide a safer API that supports only constrained operations (e.g., insertRecord, updateRecord) with allowlisted tables/columns.
Add a policy/allowlist layer (e.g., allow only INSERT/UPDATE on selected tables; forbid DROP/TRUNCATE/ALTER/GRANT).
Add optional review workflow: log + require human approval for high-risk statements; or “dry-run” mode.
Document strongly that the tool must not be exposed to untrusted prompts without additional safeguards.
Workarounds
Do not enable MySQLWriteTool for public/untrusted agents.
Use a dedicated DB user with least privilege:
- no
DROP, no ALTER, no GRANT, no access to sensitive tables unless necessary
Add an application-layer policy rejecting high-risk statements (DROP, TRUNCATE, ALTER, GRANT, REVOKE, CREATE USER, etc.).
Implement authorization gating for tool calls (RBAC, allow tool use only for trusted operators).
References
siewerFinder
Impact
MySQLWriteToolexecutes arbitrary SQL provided by the caller usingPDO::prepare()+execute()without semantic restrictions.This is consistent with the name (“write tool”), but in an LLM/agent context it becomes a high-risk capability: prompt injection or indirect prompt manipulation can cause execution of destructive queries such as
DROP TABLE,TRUNCATE,DELETE,ALTER, or privilege-related statements (subject to DB permissions).Who is impacted: Deployments that expose an agent with
MySQLWriteToolenabled to untrusted input and/or run the tool with a DB user that has broad privileges.Patches
Not patched in: 2.8.11
Recommended improvements (even if keeping the tool intentionally powerful):
Provide a safer API that supports only constrained operations (e.g.,
insertRecord,updateRecord) with allowlisted tables/columns.Add a policy/allowlist layer (e.g., allow only
INSERT/UPDATEon selected tables; forbidDROP/TRUNCATE/ALTER/GRANT).Add optional review workflow: log + require human approval for high-risk statements; or “dry-run” mode.
Document strongly that the tool must not be exposed to untrusted prompts without additional safeguards.
Workarounds
Do not enable
MySQLWriteToolfor public/untrusted agents.Use a dedicated DB user with least privilege:
DROP, noALTER, noGRANT, no access to sensitive tables unless necessaryAdd an application-layer policy rejecting high-risk statements (
DROP,TRUNCATE,ALTER,GRANT,REVOKE,CREATE USER, etc.).Implement authorization gating for tool calls (RBAC, allow tool use only for trusted operators).
References